




COMMISSION ON THE
CONSTITUTION
NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN

B A C K G R O U N D G U I D E

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Letter from the Executive Board

Greetings Delegates, It is with great pleasure that we welcome you to the Commission on the Constitution, National Diet of Japan being simulated at the Thirteenth Session of La Martiniere Model United Nations, 2026.

The Background Guide has been drafted for you to have a holistic grasp of the Agendum at hand and its relevant parameters. We strictly hold to use this Guide to build upon your own research. The Agendum is fairly nuanced to have an engaging debate across multiple aspects, some of which have been expressly highlighted here.

Delegates are advised to avoid engaging in a partisan manner of research and learn to deliberate on competing perspectives, bring out the core tension and suggest thoughtful measures to the issue at hand. We expect the delegates to adhere to the mandate of the Commission provided below and of the Diet at large. Deliberations must keep in mind the capacity of the committee to bring about a significant change in the governance of Japan. The multi-faceted nature of the Agendum is what distinguishes it from any other item of discussion in any other legislative body. Delegates must take into account the historical aspect, the legal mechanisms operating and how history, domestic politics, society, security concerns and public sentiment are crucial factors in shaping the question put before this Commission. Meaningful debate can only follow from extensive research of principles, understanding of the context behind the policy and actions taken, and articulated placement of the imported principles within the broader context of the debate.

We intend to make these three days a true learning experience which the delegates can carry beyond the committee. You may contact us for any query at dietofjapan.lmun26@gmail.com

Research well. Join the dots. Make a difference!

Regards,

The Executive Board.

Vani Nigam
Chairperson

Shaurya Vardhan Singh
Vice-Chairperson

Bhumika Pandey
Vice-Chairperson

About the Committee

The Commission on the Constitution of Japan, established on the 167th Session of the National Diet of Japan, 2007, is the permanent body tasked with broad and comprehensive assessment of the Constitution of Japan, as well as legislation closely associated with the provisions of the Constitution. It also has the power to consider amendment bills of the Constitution as well as bills pertaining to the initiation of constitutional amendments or amendments to the national referendum. The present structure has succeeded the Research Commission on the Constitution established during the 147th Session of the National Diet of Japan, 2000. It provides both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors with a separate Commission on the Constitution.

Organization

- Members are appointed in the beginning of each session. Membership is appointed to each political group in proportion to their numerical strength
- The Chairperson of the Commission is elected among the members of the Commission, as its representative. He/she is also assisted with a number of directors.
- The Chairperson may hold a meeting of directors for consultation on the management and overall direction of the Commission proceedings

Management

Meetings

- The Commission holds meetings at any time it deems fit, regardless of the Diet being in session or not.

Quorum and Voting

- The quorum as it stands, is at least one-half of the members of the commission
- Decisions are passed by a majority (simple majority)
- The chairman has a casting vote to be exercised in the event of a tie

Open Hearings

- The commission may hold open hearings for the purposes of research, analysis or examination
- The commission is bound to hold open hearings when they involve deliberation upon Preliminary Draft Amendments to the Constitution.

Joint Meetings

- The Commission of the Constitution of one house may hold a joint meeting with the other House for the purpose of deliberation on Preliminary Draft Amendments to the Constitution. The joint meetings of the Commission on the Constitution may make recommendations concerning the amendments to the Constitution to the Commission on the Constitution of each house.

Background and Birth of Article 9

End of WW2 and the Allied Occupation

Japan faced a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Allied Forces, following which the United States took over the responsibility of the Rehabilitation of Japanese State. The Occupation (1945-1952) under US, led by General Douglas A. MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces (SCAP) brought about sweeping military, political, socio-economic reforms. Japan lost much of its expansionist character, the imperial glory, and renounced claims on multiple territories. It had conceded to a complete surrender under the Potsdam Declaration 1945. Leaders spearheading its WW2 campaigns were sentenced to death (including Prime Minister Hideki Tojo) or life imprisonment by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal 1946-48.

Post War Reconstruction and Birth of the Constitution

The Allies proceeded with a three-phased plan: To punish and reform Japan, revival of the economy and conclusion with a formal treaty and long-term alliance. Out of these, the first phase (1945-47) was significant in bringing about changes in the Japanese Governance structure and the society. The war crime trials in Tokyo signaled as a clear disapproval of Japanese militarism and expansionism. The society was made to feel the need to repent for Japan's actions in the war. Militarism and War were deemed inexcusable and were also seen to provide a justified reason for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This thought was rooted deep enough to be reflected in the Preamble:

“We, the Japanese people, ...resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, ...”

The Japanese Army was dismantled. Former military officers were debarred from assuming in political or executive office in the new government. The large Japanese business conglomerates (Zaibatsu) were also effectively broken down to give way to a capitalistic free market economy.

It was under this situation that the Japanese formed their own constitution under the Allied occupation, which downgraded the emperor's status to a nominal head, introduced parliamentary features, and called for the renunciation of the right to wage war, effectively eliminating all non-defensive forces.

The rigid framing of the constitution has ensured that the Constitution of Japan remain the least amended written national constitution in the world, having never been amended till date. A hallmark feature of this constitution was the pacifist framing, demonstrated clearly in Article 9:

Background and Birth of Article 9

“ Chapter II. Renunciation of War

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. ”

Legislative History of the Present Constitution

Item 12 of the Potsdam Declaration called for the allied assistance in establishing a responsible Japanese government “ 12. *The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government”*

In September 1945, General MacArthur conveyed to the Japanese Government (led by then PM Shidehara) the need to revise the Meiji Constitution of 1899. Shidehara appointed Dr Joji Matsumoto as the chairman of the Constitution Research Committee. On February 1st 1946, the Mainichi newspaper leaked a tentative draft of Matsumoto Committee which seemed to be a slightly amended version of the previous constitution. It did not include any express article forfeiting the right to wage war. The draft was rejected and the General Headquarters (GHQ) of SCAP was tasked with formulating a new draft which was pushed to be reflected in the final constitution as we know it today. This raises significant questions of international law about the manner in which the present constitution had been drafted.

The first modern-day written record of Japan’s right to wage war is present in MacArthur’s note which read as follows:

“War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese army, navy, or air force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force”

This extreme reform was later rejected as unrealistic and deleted, conceding that the right to self-defence cannot be taken away, especially for the exercise of one’s own security. The Diet also accepted amendments by Dr. Ashida, who expressed their intended effect to open the possibility for Japan to rearm for Self-Defense purposes giving rise to the Ashida Amendment Theory.

Foundations of Modern Japanese Rearmament

The United States, by the instrument of Surrender 1945, made Japan virtually disband all its military outfits including the Imperial Army and Navy, except for a Naval minesweeping group. The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) comprising of other Allied Powers and USA also imposed heavy limitations on Japanese rearmament. In the 90th Imperial Diet Session 1946, Shigeru Yoshida (then Prime Minister) was asked a significant question whether the proposed Article 9 necessitates for Japan to abandon its right to self-defence. Yoshida responded that a plain reading of Article 9 nowhere calls for the abandonment of such right. However, he remarked, that the consequence of denying all war potential and the right of belligerency of the state, Japan must renounce the idea of war based on self-defence to achieve the objective set out in Article 9.

“Regarding the article of the draft constitution concerning renunciation of war, it looks as though you think war based on the self-defense right of the state is justifiable, but I think it is harmful to admit such a thing. Most wars have been fought in the cause of self-defense, so that it is better to wage no war at all in any cases. To acknowledge and justify a war in self-defense would only serve to invite another war and would be harmful and unprofitable.”

- Shigeru Yoshida at the 90th Imperial Diet Session

However, with the tide of the Cold War, the fear of the spread of communism and its consequential instability in East Asia caused the US to consider a shift in its policy. During the Korean War, the charge of the UN Forces to the aid of South Korea was placed under MacArthur. This caused movement of US troops who were currently stationed in Japan. There was also the fear of a soviet invasion of Japan in their absence. The fear of spread of communism loomed larger than the fear of rearming Japan. Thus, on July 8, 1950, in a letter to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, MacArthur authorized the establishment of the National Police Reserve comprising 75,000 personnel. This is often marked as the origin of the now known as Self-Defense Forces (SDF). To balance this against the limitations imposed by FEC, the arming or mobilization, other than policing measures, was prohibited.

Treaty of Peace with Japan 1951 (signed along with US Japan Security Treaty 1951)

In 1951, President Harry S Truman appointed JF Dulles as the Special Representative of the President for negotiations concerning the Japanese Peace Treaty. The United States Japan to have some burden of its own defense, which was complicated due to the FEC limitations. In fact, the Japanese government itself was reluctant to rearm Japan for any purpose. It had lost roughly 4% of its population since 1941, combined from war, famines, disease. The war had brought devastation to the Japanese populace. There were no simply monetary adjustments the government could make for a standing military. There was both a lack of desire and capability.

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This paved way for the 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty which established rights of the United States to station land, air and sea forces in and about Japan for the purposes of

1. Deterring any armed attack on Japan
2. Maintenance of International Peace and Security in the Far East
3. Putting down large-scale internal riots and disturbances, at the behest of the Japanese Government, if instigated by outside powers. It also forbade Japan from granting base, transit rights or military rights to any third country without US Consent.

Birth of SDF

The U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 1954 (MSA Agreement) has contributed most directly to the birth of SDF. It further obligated Japan to strengthen its defense capabilities. As a result, the bill to reorganise the Security Force was discussed in the Diet.

The SDF Law bill provided for a force designed to defend the nation against direct or indirect invasion. The House of Councillors, while passing the SDF law, also passed a non-binding resolution on the ban of Dispatch of SDF to Abroad to express concerns that SDF will be another instrument for the collective self-defense of a cold-war alliance.

Foundations of Modern Japanese Rearmament

US-Japan Security Treaty 1960

This replaced the 1951 treaty and further solidified the military alliance of US and Japan. It affirmed the collective security arrangement between USA and Japan, which provided Japan to act for its security in event of an attack on Japanese territory or the US bases on the soil of Japan. However, the retaining of the arrangement for US to maintain its bases in and about Japan caused the Anpo protests. Millions of citizens, trade unionists, students mobilised against a possible return to militarism. This incident reflected the presence of deep rooted pacifism and always a reminder to the governments to come to not tread carefully around this subject. Overtime, Japanese Government has carved exceptions to the foreign deployment of SDF, since the Gulf War in 1990, by various statutes, the first of them being the PKO law which allowed Japanese deployment as part of the UN peacekeeping operations.

Other specific occasions relating to anti-terrorism, war-contingency legislations, etc have also been highlighted. However, the core legal stance endorsed by Japan is the same: Japan owns the collective self-defense rights, but cannot act on them due to Article 9. As of today, Japan maintains its army, navy and air force under the banner of specific self-defense forces.

Change in Interpretation during Shinzo Abe

The Official Interpretation of Article 9 between 1972-2014 recognized only a theoretical right of defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This threshold was maintained to the extent that acting on this theoretical right had been made virtually impossible, especially exercising this right in its true sense beyond Japanese territory. The growing Chinese Military intervention, from a plain reading is barred. However, interpreting Article 9 as a whole in light of the Preamble and Article 13 which recognize the right to life, living in peace, liberty, are all supreme consideration in governmental affairs and thus justify the existence of forces such as the SDF. The purposes of self-defense by SDF should not exceed to the threshold of the “use of force” amounting to the potential of war.

Post 2012

As soon as Shinzo Abe came into power, he came with a vision that the turn of the century had changed the security environment and the present Article 9 is too restricted to accommodate these changes for a secure Japan. In 2013, he floated the idea of amending Article 96 which provides the rigid amendment procedure of the constitution, to ease amending Article 9. This was heavily criticized as a veiled move to revise Article 9 and political opposition forced him to abandon this route. In 2014 Shinzo Abe loosened the rules on export and import of arms, further detracting from the absolute pacifist idea. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau is the body responsible for interpretation of laws, including the constitution, by the executive. It advises the cabinet on the same and ensures all laws of Japan are in line with the official interpretation. CLB even interprets issues which the Supreme Court refuses to interfere with. Prime Minister Abe broke the convention of selecting the Director-General of CLB from among its members and made an appointment from the foreign office. He also set up an advisory panel (Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security). Both actions were synchronized with the **“Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People”**, dated July 1st, 2014. This decision was codified in **“Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security”**, which came in force in 2016 and now shapes the new interpretation. It affirms the right of Japan of collective self-defense for allies, foreign deployment of troops and expands the scope of situations where Japan can deploy the SDF. It held that the response to an infringement does not amount to an armed attack, wherein the infringement is a threat on Japan, or US forces or equipment (contributing to the defense of Japan) which is attacked or threatened by such infringement.

Change in Interpretation during Shinzo Abe

It provided for deployment of Japanese troops on foreign soil for peacekeeping operations (for the UN and its specialized agencies, regional organisations under Article 52 of the Charter, and other countries subject to specific requirements) in zones where there is no active combat. Japanese law strictly forbids any *Ittaika* (union) with use of force during this process.

It broadened the mandate of SDF to use weapons to rescue Japanese nationals and non-Japanese overseas given the consent of the territorial state and other conditions. It also expanded the SDF ship inspection operations mandate from “Japan’s peace and security” to “International Peace and Security”.

The Government of Japan expanded the conditions for the use of force from “an armed attack” to the following:

1. Present and wrongful danger of invasion to Japan
 2. No other appropriate measures exist to defend Japan
 3. The use of force is limited to the extent of minimal necessity
- This drew criticism from both common citizens in support of pacifism, and academics who questioned the legality of the move. However, it is undeniable that it made significant changes to the existing structure. The People’s Republic of China also condemned the legislation. It seemed likely that Abe would soon pursue a more direct form of intervention, in the form of amending Article 9 in the coming years. However, he was assassinated in 2022 before this could be realized.

Japan's Current Security Situation

Sanae Takaichi from the Liberal Democratic Party came in power in October 2025 as the first female Prime Minister of the country. She has since then advocated for a more active Japanese role in regional security in response to the changing situation in the hostile neighborhood of Japan. Under her leadership, Japan has increased its defense spendings to the ever-high hallmark of 9 trillion Yen. It also aims to fix itself within the 2% GDP Bracket for defense spending as previously held by NATO (now 5%). In August, Japan released its 2026 Defence White Paper, the first of such released under the leadership of Takaichi Government. It deemed Japan to be situated in a hostile neighborhood with the ever assertive and expansionist China as the “unprecedented and greatest challenge”. China’s presence is a roadblock to the Japanese goal of peace in the Taiwan Strait.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea poses threats beyond the traditional missile development and nuclear capability as Pyongyang increases its collaboration with its Russian counterparts.

Russia and China continue to mobilise their military activities in the “Northern Territories” as claimed by Japan but under DeFacto Russian Control (Southern Kurils). The events in the Strait of Hormuz are a reminder to Japan that it is not in a Unipolar world order.

Even as Japan acquires Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, etc. it mentions an “Exclusively-Defense-Oriented Policy”. The reference to non-nuclear principles and statements by the Takaichi become difficult to reconcile. New forms of warfare in the cyber, cognitive and electromagnetic sphere have emerged which poses a challenge for Japan to integrate the advent of new technology into its existing security architecture centered around self-defense.

Concerns involving an amendment to Article 9

Many noted that Article 9 reflects the core ethos of Post-War Japan as it adopts the pacifist view. It is inarguably a key constitutional principle and which requires both popular support and strong political will to be altered in any fashion. However, it is important to ask how such an instrumental constitutional principle, which has historically as a check on any government pursuing an aggressive militarist policy, was watered down by a Cabinet Decision and a subsequent legislation, against the popular choice. Interpretations are well within the power of the executive, however, changing a long established interpretation, fundamental to the Article and which extends to the whole of Japan as a nation in the international sphere, simply by an executive action coupled with an ordinary legislation is felt insufficient in Japanese Politics. This has well advocated the need to alter Article 9 by way of a constitutional amendment. However, the procedure for Amendment to the constitution is one of the most rigid procedures currently in the world. Article 96 of the Japan states

“Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.”

The current ruling LDP-JIP coalition does have a chance of satisfying the parliamentary threshold. However, this is easier said than done given the political fragmentations in each house. The two parties of the coalition themselves are not on exact agreement with respect to action on Article 9. Even beyond this, there is no easy way to obtain ratification by the population which is deeply divided on the issue of constitutional revision.

Concerns Involving an Amendment to Article 9

The pacifist sentiment runs deep and is prone to eruption if provoked. It is also pertinent to note the pacifist promise stands for the international commitment of Japan in the Post-War order. It was a precondition for Japanese participation in internationalism. There are justified fears about international relations of Japan in a multipolar order if any extreme revisionist policy is enacted by the country. Article 9 has historically acted as a strong check and the line between Jeitai (Self-Defense Force) and Guntai (military). Any loosening of it may complicate the existing security architecture. Critics against revision argue that the SDF operates as a military in everything but name, which very conveniently holds the Japanese promise of non-belligerency.

The distinction between a self-defense force with operations based on practicality and a nominally designated military force is also significant distinction. It preserves the Japanese image of a defender and not an aggressive, hostile state. Many oppose the idea of constitutional revisions merely to codify existing SDF practices, as it will remove the very constraint which forms the basis of SDF's legitimacy.

Article 9 is shaped both by its textual rigidity and interpretive flexibility, a balance which is susceptible to disturbance by an attempt aimed at redefining what it stands for. Thus, the question of constitutional revision carries the concern of political requisites, the will of the people, the need for a change and whether the population desires a change.

Relevant Actors


Foreign Powers

The United States has traditionally held the view that Japan should possess adequate self-defense measures. It is the principal supplier of missiles, troop support, drills, etc to Japan. This view is motivated both by strategic partnership and averting a disproportionate responsibility of Japanese Defence on the United States. Even though Japan is not a part of NATO, it continuously aligns its security architecture to that of the NATO allies. For Russia and China (PRC), a more strong-armed Japan is a threat to their ambitions as the sole diplomatic powers in their region. The same also follows for North Korea, which has also reportedly engaged in cautious monitoring of Japanese armory.

Political Parties

Liberal Democratic Party: The ruling Liberal Democratic Party, coupled with its coalition possesses the requisite 2/3 majority following the 2026 Snap elections where it secured 316 seats in the lower house. Sanae Takaichi has made her stand expressly clear as she identifies herself as the political heir of Shinzo Abe. The LDP adopts the view that changing hostile environment calls for a more actionable self-defense policy rooted in pragmatism. The LDP remains divided on the issue of deletion of the second paragraph. However there seems to be agreement on the addition of SDF as a legitimate force inscribed within the constitution as the anchor of Japan's defense architecture

Figure 1: Japan 2026 Lower House Election Results



Results of the 2026 Snap Elections, Lower House, Diet of Japan

Relevant Actors

Japanese Innovation Party (JIP): the JIP replaced Komeito as the junior coalition partner of LDP in October 2025. JIP's position differs significantly where it advocates for complete deletion of Article 9's second paragraph. It further calls for establishment of a national defense army. A constitutional drafting council between LDP and JIP was established in November 2025, pursuant to the coalition agreement. The first meeting in April 2026 failed to narrow the differences.

Komeito: The previous political partner of LDP, it maintains the pacifist stance which opposes revisions to core wording of Article 9. It considers the unaltered provision as foundational to Japan's postwar pacifism.

Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA)*: An alliance between Komeito and Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan. It was intended to counter the wave of LDP-JIP's revisionist agenda. The Abe-led legislations were viewed as a violation of constitutionalism. The CRA was disbanded in September 2026 after a heavy defeat in the 2026 Snap elections.

Institutions

Supreme Court of Japan: The Supreme Court of Japan has historically avoided a direct ruling to answer any question of law on Article 9. In *Sakata v. Japan*, it negated the deprivation of right of self-defense of Japan.

Since then, it has applied the Sunakawa Doctrine. Which calls for major national security decisions (highly political arrangements) to be beyond the scope of judicial reference unless they represent a clear form of constitutional violation, thus deferring the political question to the Cabinet and Diet.

The Diet consists of the House of Representatives, the Lower House (465 members) and the House of Councillors (248), it further houses several sub-committees including this commission.



Questions to Consider & Paperwork

1. Is the situation under which the current constitution was drafted, relevant to the legitimacy of Article 9?
2. Can Cabinet decisions alter fundamentally constitutional provisions without any democratic checks to ensure popular agreement with the decision?
3. Is the non-interference of Judiciary in Article 9 revisions an act of cautious restraint or failure of duty to uphold constitutional values?
4. Whether the SDF, as a whole amounts to a self-defense force or an offensive outfit?
5. How can Japan accommodate evolving forms of warfare within its existing pacifist structure?
6. What can this commission, in its capacity, do pave a path towards a decisive outcome on the question of Article 9?

Position Paper

The Executive Board shall be expecting Position Papers from each delegate. We have attached below a sample Position Paper. Delegates are expected to follow the same pattern as attached. The position paper should briefly state your stance, your broad analysis of the agenda and possible plan of action, while not exceeding 2 pages. It is intended to facilitate clear communication of your goals and expectations from the committee. All position papers should be submitted on the committee email id -dietofjapan.lmun26@gmail.com

Note: The deadline for submission is 25th October, 1800 Hours.

Links for further research

Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security - "The World and Japan" Database

Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Japan's Constitutional Debate Accelerates | Council on Foreign Relations

Japan's Evolving Position on the Use of Force in Collective Self-Defense | Lawfare Challenging

Japan's 'War Laws': contemporary civil society action in the courts | Melbourne Asia Review

US unpredictability cuts both ways in Japan's Article 9 debate | East Asia Forum Reinterpreting Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan | UCL Constitution Unit blog Defining a 'normal' country: Japan's long struggle between pacifism and the threats of a new era

<https://www.reuters.com/article/world/factbox-main-elements-of-japans-security-legislation-idUSKCN0RE2F8/>

https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5009

https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2020/pdf/R02020501.pdf

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2019/05/with-little-fanfare-japan-just-changed-the-way-it-uses.html>

https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/chosa/en/background.htm

ANNEXTURE I:

ANNEXTURE II:**POSITION PAPER**

Name of the Member: Priyam Kushagra

Portfolio: Cleon

Committee Name: Semi Crisis Committee (The Delian League)

EXPOSITION TO THE AGENDA The situation in the Attic Peninsula grows with hastened tenacity in 432 BCE. The year prior, Athens intervened in the Epidamnian Affair on the side of Corcyra, antagonising Corinth, and hence Sparta. Pericles has rightly resolved to anger Spartan blood against Athens but subsequently has stubbornly opted to portray us, the sons of Athena, as chickens rushing into their coop behind the Long Walls. I, Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, shall not remain silent. I will rise intrepid and rise high above the aristocratic, tame temper of Pericles. After championing over Corinth and crippling Megara, Pericles wishes to spectate from the Parthenon which he made by exploiting mercantile wealth. Cleon, the champion voice of the demos, shall proclaim the fervour, which should be borne by the blood of every Athenian son, in the Ekklesia.

The Megarian Decree has left their civilians slowly starving [Aristophanes], Athenian hegemony is spreading to more poleis. Time and time again Athens has proved its mettle by subduing dissent and opposition whether it be Naxos, Thasos or Megara who encroached upon the sacred Hieria Orgas. Athens has secured financial resources through the relocation of the Delian treasury from Delos along with a trade network so robust that the Athenian silver coinage is propagated all across the Mediterranean. The triremes fleet of Chalcidian timber has ensured utter naval dominance in the Aegean Sea. Like deceitful stallions who make pompous commitment of their mettle but capsize in implementation, with such sheer upper hand over the Spartans, Pericles ordered the people to desert their farmlands and cower indoors. After impelling Athens into war [Thucydides 1.127.3], he sacrificed the countryside of Attica, Periclean strategy has rested on deliberately forfeiting outward success. [Bengtson] Neither the demos nor I, their representative, shall tolerate this cowardice. Sparta will face the wrath of its misdoings.

Pericles' rule shall only lead Athens to turmoil, strife, famine and decay. It is certain that his aristocratic and cowardly temper needs to be weeded out of the government of the people. Athens, nominally a democracy has become, in his hands, a government by the first citizen.[Thucydides 2.65.9] The demos as well as I call for outright and truculent warfare. As Prometheus gave the mortals flame from Olympus, I shall give the demos, especially the merchants, give them rights and drachmai of their share as did the great Solon. I aim for my ascendance as the de facto leader of the Delian League. However, my primary objective remains to erase Sparta from the map of Hellas or conclude my mortality at the edge of a Spartan dory.

ANNEXTURE II:

PLANS OF ACTION

Following are a few of the crisis arcs that may be utilised by me during the course of the committee at the appropriate time.

1. Release a **Press Release** to the Athenian public, appealing to their ardent desire of dynamic belligerent action and how Pericles remains in his patrician arrogance and timid war tactics while the commoners suffer.
2. Formulate one or more **Communiques** for increasing fortifications and reinforcements at crucial locations such as Oenoe and Thebes, along with military training and recruitment of the psiloi into the regular army to increase numeric strength.
3. A **joint communique** with **Diomedon** will sanction a complete naval blockade of Peloponnesian ports by the superior Athenian triremes fleet.
4. An army of **6000 hoplites** and **900 cavalry**, separate from Athen's 13,000 hoplites in the city, will be formed in **Thessaly** with main centres as Larissa, Pharsalus, Crannon, Gyrton, Pherae, Pyrasus. This army, called the **Thessalian Regiment**, shall be supplemented by the Athenian forces (numbers to be determined) and a smaller army from **Naupaktos** will be deployed towards **Boeotia**, which is under Peloponnesian rule and invade it.

(Signed)

Cleon

Prostatai tou demou

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