


LA MARTINIÈRE
MODEL UNITED NATIONS

BACKGROUND GUIDE



LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Greetings Delegates!

It gives us immense pleasure to welcome you all to this simulation of the Cabinet Committee On Security (CCS) at 'LMUN 2026'. We look forward to an enriching and rewarding experience.

This study guide is by no means the end of the research; we would very much appreciate it if the members are able to find new realms in the agenda and bring them forth to the committee. Such research, combined with good argumentation and a solid representation of facts, is what makes an excellent performance.

In the session, the executive board will encourage you to speak as much as possible, as fluency, diction, or oratory skills have very little importance as opposed to the content you deliver. So, prime emphasis on research is recommended.

The Executive Board looks forward to an efficient & progressive committee as the issue is very sensitive. We, therefore, expect you all to play your roles with responsibility. Hopefully, we, as members of the Executive Board, will also have a chance to gain insight from this committee.

All the best! Regards,

Executive Board
ccs.lmun26@gmail.com

Suggested Pattern For Researching

To start researching the agenda of the committee, participating members should do the following:

1. Start researching your respective portfolios and their expected domain knowledge. As no definite document may be found which contains this the delegates must do the tedious yet rewarding work of going through past news clippings/ magazine articles/ government websites/ social media handles/ YouTube videos to understand their stance on the said agenda.
2. After gaining knowledge about the portfolios, the delegates must start their research on the agenda at hand. This must be done by researching further upon the agenda using the footnotes and links given in the guide and from other sources such as academic papers, institutional or governmental reports, national reports, news articles, blogs, etc.
3. Characterise the agenda into sub-topics and prepare speeches and statements on them. The delegates should also prepare a list of possible solutions and actions that the cabinet can suggest/adopt on the issue.
4. Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/ allegation you are going to use in committee, and keep your research updated using various news sources, specifically government studies or data released by the same.
5. To have an edge in the committee in terms of debate, delegates must also research the other portfolios and try to find their contradictory statements or controversial stands on various issues to raise allegations/ substantial questions in the committee.
6. Lastly, we would expect all the delegates to put in serious efforts in research and preparation for the simulation and work hard to make it a fruitful learning experience for all.

Committee Overview

About Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)

The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is the Union Government's highest level political forum for deliberating on matters with significant implications for national security. It operates within the executive framework of the Government of India, with its functioning supported by the Cabinet Secretariat under the constitutional framework of Article 77(3) and the Government of India's Rules of Business.

Mandate

The CCS deals with defence-related matters, internal security and law-and-order issues, foreign-policy matters having internal or external security implications, and economic or political issues affecting national security. Its precise composition and allocation of business are determined by executive orders under the Rules of Business rather than by a separate constitutional provision creating the CCS.

Composition

The CCS is chaired by the Prime Minister and ordinarily comprises the Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs, External Affairs and Finance. The exact composition can be altered through Government orders.

The CCS is an executive decision-making forum, not a legislative or judicial body. It is convened when matters requiring coordinated, high-level national security decisions arise. The Cabinet Secretariat provides secretarial assistance, circulates agenda papers, records discussions and monitors implementation.

In actual government functioning, CCS meetings have addressed military and internal-security situations as well as crises with wider economic and strategic consequences. In 2026, for example, the CCS reviewed the implications of the West Asia conflict for India's energy, food, fertiliser, shipping, trade and supply-chain security, illustrating its whole-of-government character.

For this Crisis Simulation

In the simulation, the CCS functions as a real-time national-security decisionmaking body. Members must assess intelligence, debate competing national interests and authorise coordinated political, diplomatic, economic, security and strategic responses as the crisis develops.

Present Day India

It is 2049. India has completed more than a century as an independent republic.

The transformation is unmistakable. India has crossed the US\$30 trillion economic mark, fulfilling the central economic ambition of the Viksit Bharat vision. The country is highly urbanised, deeply industrialised and technologically integrated, with infrastructure and productive capacity on a scale that would have been difficult to imagine at the beginning of the century.

But the story of India's development has not been geographically uniform.

The southern states have performed exceptionally well. Earlier investments in education, healthcare, population stabilisation, urbanisation and human capital translated into higher productivity, stronger industrial and services sectors and substantially higher standards of living. The demographic success of these states, however, produced an unexpected political consequence: their populations grew more slowly while other parts of India continued to account for a growing share of the national population.

For twenty years, this contradiction remained contained.

The Constitutional Allocation Amendment Act, 2029 (CAA 2029), froze the interstate allocation of Lok Sabha seats until 2049. It gave India's states something increasingly rare in politics: time. The South retained its existing parliamentary weight while the country continued its development journey; the North gained the economic and demographic space to catch up. The arrangement broadly preserved federal harmony for two decades.

But compromises have an expiry date.

2049 is that date.

The demographic bargain that once helped India develop together is now being questioned precisely because development has succeeded so differently across its regions. What was once a technical question of representation has become a question of political power, fiscal fairness and the future balance of the Indian Union. And the country has reached the moment it postponed for twenty years.

Key Developments

The Semiconductor Breakthrough

India's rise by 2049 was also shaped by its emergence as a major semiconductor power.

A decisive shift came in 2040, when the global semiconductor industry was thrown into severe disruption following the collapse of TSMC. The resulting shortage of advanced semiconductors and nanochips forced countries to reconsider the security of their technology supply chains.

India's response was centred in Bengaluru.

The Bharatiya Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (BSMC) was established in the city, drawing upon existing Indian semiconductor capabilities and resources. Its development was supported through collaboration with Germany's Infineon Technologies and the supply of advanced lithography equipment from the Netherlands. By 2049, the facility had acquired the capability to manufacture chips at angstrom class nodes and generated approximately \$4 trillion in annual revenue.

The development transformed Bengaluru from a technology hub into one of India's most strategically significant industrial centres. Semiconductor manufacturing had become critical to defence, telecommunications, artificial intelligence, automobiles and digital infrastructure.

It also added another dimension to India's emerging federal tensions.

The states that had driven much of the country's demographic and economic transformation now hosted some of its most strategically important assets. Their importance was no longer measured only through population, taxation or representation. It was increasingly tied to India's technological and strategic power.

By 2049, the semiconductor question had therefore become inseparable from the larger question confronting the Union: how should political power be distributed when economic and strategic power had become so unevenly concentrated?

Geopolitical Developments

By 2049, the world order had changed considerably from the one India had inherited at the beginning of the century.

Key Developments

The United States is no longer the world's uncontested superpower. China has emerged as a power of comparable global significance, possessing enormous economic, technological and military capabilities and exercising growing influence across Asia and beyond. The international system had consequently become more competitive and increasingly multipolar.

A major turning point came in 2040, when China took control of Taiwan. The development fundamentally altered the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific and accelerated the restructuring of global supply chains.

China's growing confidence had also been accompanied by a more assertive approach to territorial and strategic interests. Its longstanding claims over Arunachal Pradesh had remained a major point of contention with India, while its approach towards Macau has become increasingly consequential as the 2049 deadline under the Basic Law approaches.

For India, this meant that the strategic environment of 2049 was no longer defined by a single dominant power. Washington remained important, Beijing had become considerably more powerful, and New Delhi itself had acquired far greater economic and strategic weight.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN 2049

Indian Air Force

(43 fighter squadrons, about 770 jets)

- Vajrayudh sixth-generation fighter, built with France: 3 squadrons
- AMCA fifth-generation stealth fighter: 12 squadrons
- Rafale: 8 squadrons
- Su-30MKI (Super Sukhoi): 8 squadrons
- Tejas Mk1A: 5 squadrons
- Tejas Mk2: 7 squadrons
- Combat drones (CATS Warrior, Ghatak): 120
- Surveillance drones: 40 • Airborne early warning aircraft: 18
- Tankers: 12
- Transport aircraft: 139
- Attack helicopters: 66 Prachand, 22 Apache
- Air defence: 5 S-400 squadrons, Project Kusha

Key Developments

Indian Navy (240 ships and submarines)

- Aircraft carriers: INS Vikrant, INS Vikramaditya (second Vikrant-class), INS Vishal (nuclear-powered, 75,000 t), plus INS Viraat fitting out
- Carrier fighters: 26 Rafale M, 57 TEDBF, 24 carrier drones
- Nuclear attack submarines: 6
- Diesel submarines: 12 (6 Project 75I, 6 Kalvari)
- Destroyers: 14
- Frigates: 21
- Corvettes: 28
- Amphibious assault ships: 4
- Patrol aircraft and helicopters: 18 P-8I, 24 MH-60R, 15 MQ-9B

Indian Army (about 1.05 million personnel)

- Main battle tanks: 2,318 (1,200 FRCV, 1,000 T-90, 118 Arjun)
- Light tanks: 354 Zorawar
- Guns: 1,350 (600 ATAGS, plus K9 Vajra, M777 and Dhanush)
- Rocket artillery: 22 Pinaka regiments
- Missile regiments: 4 Pralay, 8 BrahMos
- Attack helicopters: 90 Prachand, 30 Apache
- Air defence: 30 regiments
- Attack and loitering drones: about 5,000

Nuclear forces (Strategic Forces Command)

- Approximately 420 warheads: about 180 on land, 170 at sea, 70 in the air • Land missiles: 60 Agni-P, 40 Agni-V MIRV, 12 Agni-VI
- Nuclear ballistic missile submarines: 7 (3 Arihant class, 4 S5 class), always 2 on patrol
- Air: 2 nuclear-tasked squadrons (Rafale and Vajrayudh)
- Confides in Non-First Use Policy

Joint forces

- 3 theatre commands plus the Andaman and Nicobar Command
- Space Command with about 160 military satellites
- Cyber Command
- Sudarshan Chakra air and missile shield, complete since 2035

Relevant Laws

The constitutional starting point for any national-security response is **Article 355 of the Constitution**, which provides:

“It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”

Article 355 is a constitutional duty, not by itself a power to arrest citizens or deploy the armed forces. The actual executive action must therefore be traced to another constitutional or statutory provision. This distinction becomes important in a CCS crisis: the Union may have a constitutional responsibility to act, but the manner in which it acts must have an independent legal basis.

In *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India*, (1994) 3 SCC 1, the Supreme Court treated Articles 355 and 356 within the framework of Indian federalism and subjected Union intervention to constitutional limitations and judicial review.

Where a State government genuinely cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution, **Article 356** provides the mechanism for President's Rule. It permits the President,

“where the President, on receipt of report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution,”

to issue a Proclamation assuming specified State functions and declaring that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by or under Parliament's authority. The Proclamation must be laid before both Houses of Parliament and ceases to operate unless approved within the constitutionally prescribed period. The essential threshold is therefore **constitutional breakdown**, not political disagreement, protest or an ordinary law-and-order problem. *S.R. Bommai* established that Article 356 is subject to judicial review and cannot be treated as an unrestricted political power. The Court emphasised restoration of elected government as the constitutional objective.

or immediate public-order situations, the **Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)** provides preventive mechanisms. **Section 163** permits an empowered Executive Magistrate, where sufficient grounds exist and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, to issue a written order directing a person to abstain from a particular act or to take specified steps where necessary to prevent

“obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed,” “danger to human life, health or safety,” “a disturbance of the public tranquillity,” “a riot,” or “an affray.”

Relevant Laws

The order may be passed in urgent circumstances and can operate against individuals or the public generally within a specified area. Sections **149 and 150** separately provide mechanisms for dispersing unlawful assemblies through armed forces in the circumstances prescribed by the Sanhita. These provisions are preventive public-order powers, not a general licence for military intervention.

Their closest jurisprudential predecessor is **Section 144 CrPC**, under which *Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate*, (1970) 3 SCC 746, recognised the exceptional nature of urgent preventive powers while insisting that statutory conditions and constitutional limitations remain applicable. The current BNSS is the governing procedural statute.

Where conduct threatens the sovereignty, integrity or security of India, the **Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA)** becomes particularly relevant. **Section 13(1)** provides that whoever

“takes part in or commits, or advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity”

is punishable in accordance with the provision. **Section 15(1)** defines a terrorist act where a person,

“with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country,”

does the acts specified in the section, including acts involving death, injury, destruction of property, disruption of essential services or attacks on specified governmental or defence-related installations. The crucial point is that **political dissent, separatist advocacy or protest does not automatically satisfy Section 15**; the statutory ingredients must be established.

The Supreme Court's treatment of UAPA offences in cases including *Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State of NCT of Delhi* demonstrates the importance of distinguishing ordinary public-order offences from terrorist activity.

For threats where immediate prosecution is considered insufficient to protect national security or public order, the **National Security Act, 1980** provides preventive detention. **Section 3** permits the Central Government, State Government, or an authorised officer to order detention where satisfied that detention is necessary with a view to preventing a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to, among other matters,

Relevant Laws

“the defence of India,” “the security of India,” “the security of the State,” “the maintenance of public order,” or “the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community,” subject to the precise statutory conditions. Preventive detention is therefore fundamentally different from punishment following conviction: its legal justification is prevention of anticipated harmful conduct. **Article 22** of the Constitution supplies important procedural safeguards.

In *A.K. Roy v. Union of India*, (1982) 1 SCC 271, and *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*, (2011) 5 SCC 244, the Supreme Court stressed that preventive detention cannot become a substitute for ordinary criminal prosecution and must remain within the statutory purpose.

Finally, where an area is formally declared a “disturbed area,” the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA) provides exceptional powers. Section 4 permits a commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or equivalent rank, in a disturbed area, to use force, including lethal force in the circumstances expressly specified, against a person acting in contravention of laws or orders prohibiting assembly or carrying weapons, and permits specified powers of arrest without warrant and search.

Section 5 requires a person arrested under the Act to be handed over to the officer in-charge of the nearest police station “with the least possible delay.” AFSPA therefore requires the statutory precondition of a valid disturbed-area declaration and does not place the armed forces beyond law.

In *Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India*, (1998) 2 SCC 109, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of AFSPA while emphasising that the powers conferred by it were subject to statutory and constitutional limitations. The Court's subsequent jurisprudence has also recognised that allegations of excessive force cannot simply be immunised from investigation.

List of Valid Sources

- Constitution of India
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)
- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA)
- National Security Act, 1980 (NSA)
- Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA)
- Disaster Management Act, 2005
- Information Technology Act, 2000
- Telecommunications Act, 2023
- Official Government of India Sources — Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Press Information Bureau and official notifications
- Supreme Court of India Judgments
- Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961 and Allocation of Business Rules, 1961
- Parliamentary Debates and Parliamentary Committee Reports
- Official State Government Sources

Happy Researching!

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